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PART I. General Principles of Right |
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Of the nature of man considered with regard to right: of the understanding, and whatever is relative to this faculty |
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1 | (12) |
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Design of this work: what is meant by natural law |
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We must deduce the principles of this science from the nature and state of man |
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2 | (1) |
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Definition of man; what his nature is |
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3 | (1) |
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Different actions of man: which are those that are the object of right? |
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4 | (1) |
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Principal faculties of the soul |
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5 | (1) |
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Principle. The understanding is naturally right |
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6 | (1) |
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In what manner perception, attention, and examen, are formed |
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7 | (1) |
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8 | (1) |
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Of the senses, the imagination, and memory |
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9 | (1) |
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The perfection of the understanding consists in the knowledge of truth. Two obstacles to this perfection, ignorance and error |
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Different sorts of error. 1. Error of the law, and of the fact. 2. Voluntary and involuntary. 3. Essential and accidental |
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10 | (3) |
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Continuation of the principles relative to the nature of man. Of will and liberty |
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13 | (20) |
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The will. What happiness and good consist in |
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Instincts, inclinations, passions |
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14 | (1) |
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Liberty: in what it consists |
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15 | (1) |
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Use of liberty in our judgments in respect to truth |
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16 | (2) |
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Liberty has its exercise, even in regard to things that are evident |
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18 | (2) |
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19 | (1) |
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Use of liberty with regard to good and evil |
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With regard to indifferent things |
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20 | (1) |
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Why the exercise of liberty is restrained to non-evident truths, and particular goods |
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21 | (2) |
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The proof of liberty drawn from our inward sense, is superior to any other |
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23 | (3) |
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How comes it that liberty has been contested |
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26 | (1) |
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Actions are voluntary, and involuntary; free, necessary, and constrained |
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27 | (3) |
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Our faculties help one another reciprocally |
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30 | (1) |
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Causes of the diversity we observe in the conduct of men |
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31 | (1) |
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Reason has it always in her power to remain mistress |
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32 | (1) |
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That man thus constituted, is a creature capable of moral direction, and accountable for his actions |
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33 | (3) |
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Man is capable of direction in regard to his conduct |
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He is accountable for his actions: they can be imputed to him |
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34 | (1) |
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Principle of imputability. We must not confound it with imputation |
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35 | (1) |
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Further inquiry into what relates to human nature, by considering the different states of man |
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36 | (8) |
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Primitive and original states |
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37 | (1) |
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1. State of man with regard to God |
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37 | (1) |
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3. State of solitude. 4. Peace: war |
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38 | (1) |
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State of man with regard to the goods of the earth |
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39 | (1) |
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Adventitious states. 1. Family. 2. Marriage |
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40 | (1) |
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Weakness of man at his birth. Natural dependance of children on their parents |
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41 | (1) |
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Civil state and government |
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The civil state and property of goods give rise to several adventitious states |
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42 | (1) |
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True idea of the natural state of man |
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Difference between original and adventitious states |
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43 | (1) |
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That man ought to square his conduct by rule; the method of finding out this rule; and the foundations of right in general |
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44 | (8) |
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It is not convenient, that man should live without a rule |
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45 | (1) |
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A rule supposes an end, an aim |
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46 | (1) |
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The ultimate end of man is happiness |
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`Tis the system of providence |
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47 | (1) |
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The desire of happiness is essential to man, and inseparable from reason |
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Self-love is a principle that has nothing vicious in itself |
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48 | (1) |
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Man cannot attain to happiness but by the help of reason |
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49 | (1) |
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Reason is therefore the primitive rule of man |
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50 | (1) |
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What is right in general? |
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51 | (1) |
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General rules of conduct prescribed by reason. Of the nature and first foundations of obligation |
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52 | (15) |
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Reason gives us several rules of conduct |
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First rule. To make a right distinction of goods and evils |
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53 | (2) |
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Second rule. True happiness cannot consist in things that are inconsistent with the nature and state of man |
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55 | (1) |
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Third rule. To compare the present and the future together |
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56 | (1) |
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Sixth rule. To give the goods that excel most, the preference |
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57 | (1) |
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Seventh rule. In some cases possibility only, and by a much stronger reason probability, ought to determine us |
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58 | (1) |
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Eighth rule. To have a relish for true goods |
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59 | (1) |
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Our mind acquiesces naturally to these maxims; and they ought to influence our conduct |
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60 | (1) |
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Of obligation generally considered |
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61 | (2) |
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Obligation may be more or less strong |
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63 | (1) |
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Dr. Clark's opinion on the nature and origin of obligation |
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63 | (1) |
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Monsieur Barbeyrac's opinion concerning this subject |
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64 | (2) |
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Two sorts of obligations; internal and external |
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66 | (1) |
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Of right considered as a faculty, and of the obligation thereto corresponding |
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67 | (9) |
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The word right is taken in several particular senses, which are all derived from the general notion |
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Definition of right, considered as a faculty |
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68 | (1) |
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We must take care to distinguish between a simple power, and right |
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69 | (1) |
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General foundation of the rights of man |
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70 | (1) |
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Right produces obligation |
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Right and obligation are two relative terms |
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71 | (2) |
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At what time man is susceptible of right and obligation |
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Several sorts of rights and obligations |
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73 | (3) |
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76 | (5) |
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As man by nature is a dependent being, the law ought to be the rule of his actions |
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78 | (1) |
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Why law is defined a rule prescribed |
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What is understood by a sovereign, sovereignty, and the right of commanding |
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79 | (2) |
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Of the foundation of sovereignty, or the right of commanding |
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81 | (17) |
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First remark. The question is, in regard to a necessary sovereignty |
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Second remark. There is neither sovereignty nor necessary dependance between beings perfectly equal |
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82 | (1) |
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Different opinions on the origin and foundation of sovereignty |
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83 | (1) |
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Examen of those opinions. 1. The sole superiority of power is insufficient to found a right of commanding |
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84 | (2) |
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2. Nor the sole excellence or superiority of nature |
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86 | (1) |
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3. Nor the sole quality of creator |
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87 | (2) |
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True foundation of sovereignty; power, wisdom, and goodness joined together |
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89 | (1) |
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Explication of our opinion |
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90 | (2) |
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We must not separate the qualities which form the right of sovereignty |
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92 | (2) |
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Definition of subjection. Foundation of dependance |
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94 | (1) |
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The obligation produced by law, is the most perfect that can be imagined |
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95 | (1) |
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Obligation is internal and external at the same time |
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96 | (2) |
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Of the end of laws; of their characters, differences, &c |
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98 | (27) |
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Of the end of laws, either in regard to the subjects, or in respect to the sovereign |
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The end of laws is not to lay a restraint upon liberty, but to direct it in a proper manner |
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99 | (1) |
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Examen of what Puffendorf says concerning this subject |
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100 | (1) |
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Of the distinction of law into obligatory, and that of simple permission |
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101 | (1) |
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The opinion of Grotius and Puffendorf upon this subject |
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The rights which men enjoy in society, are founded on this permission |
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102 | (1) |
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103 | (1) |
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Internal conditions of a law; that it be possible, useful, and just |
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External conditions of a law; that it be made known; and accompanied with a sanction |
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104 | (2) |
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Whether the promise of recompence is equally capable, as the commination of punishment, to constitute the sanction of law |
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106 | (1) |
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Who those are whom the law obliges. Of dispensation |
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107 | (1) |
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Of the duration of laws, and how they are abolished |
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108 | (1) |
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109 | (2) |
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Of the morality of human actions |
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In what the morality of actions consists |
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111 | (1) |
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Actions are 1. either commanded, or forbidden, or permitted |
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Remarks on permitted actions |
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112 | (1) |
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2. Actions are good or just, bad or unjust, and indifferent |
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113 | (1) |
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Conditions requisite to render an action morally good |
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114 | (1) |
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Of the nature of bad or unjust actions |
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115 | (1) |
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All just actions are equally just; but unjust actions are more or less unjust |
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116 | (1) |
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Essential character of unjust actions |
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117 | (1) |
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Division of good and bad actions |
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118 | (1) |
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Of justice and its different kinds |
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119 | (2) |
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Of the relative estimations of moral actions |
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121 | (1) |
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Morality is applicable to persons as well as actions |
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122 | (3) |
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PART II. Of the Law of Nature |
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In what the law of nature consists, and that there is such a thing. First considerations drawn from the existence of God and his authority over us |
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125 | (12) |
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Subject of this second part |
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Whether there are any natural laws |
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126 | (1) |
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127 | (1) |
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First proof. The necessity of a self-existent and intelligent being |
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We must not seek for this being in this universe |
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128 | (1) |
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Second proof. The necessity of a first mover |
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129 | (1) |
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Third proof. The structure, order, and beauty of the universe |
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130 | (1) |
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The world is not the effect of chance |
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131 | (1) |
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132 | (1) |
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God has a right to prescribe laws to man |
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133 | (1) |
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This is a consequence of his power, wisdom, and goodness |
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134 | (3) |
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That God, in consequence of his authority over us has actually thought proper to prescribe to us laws or rules of conduct |
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137 | (8) |
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God exercises his authority over us, by prescribing laws to us |
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First proof, drawn from the very relations of which we have been speaking |
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Second proof, drawn from the end which God proposed to himself with respect to man, and from the necessity of moral laws, to accomplish this end |
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138 | (1) |
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Confirmation of the preceding proofs |
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139 | (2) |
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Third proof, drawn from the goodness of God |
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141 | (1) |
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Fourth proof, drawn from the principles of conduct which we actually find within ourselves |
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142 | (1) |
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These principles are obligatory of themselves |
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143 | (1) |
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They are obligatory by the divine will, and thus become real laws |
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144 | (1) |
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Of the means by which we discern what is just and unjust, or what is dictated by natural law; namely, moral instinct, and reason |
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145 | (8) |
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First means of discerning moral good and evil, namely, instinct or inward sense |
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146 | (1) |
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Whence these sensations proceed |
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Of what use they are to us |
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147 | (1) |
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Objection: these sensations are not found in all men. Answer: 1. We find some traces of them among the most savage people |
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148 | (1) |
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2. We must not distinguish between the natural state of man, and that of his depravation |
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149 | (1) |
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3. If there be any monsters in the moral order, they are very rare, and no consequence can be drawn from them |
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Second means of discerning moral good and evil; which is reason |
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150 | (1) |
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First advantage of reason in respect to instinct; it serves to verify it |
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151 | (1) |
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Second advantage: it unfolds the principles, and from thence infers proper consequences |
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Third advantage: reason is an universal means, and applicable to all cases |
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152 | (1) |
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Of the principles from whence reason may deduce the law of nature |
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153 | (28) |
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From whence are we to deduce the principles of the law of nature? |
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Preliminary remarks. What we understand by principles of natural law |
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154 | (2) |
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Character of those principles |
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Whether we ought to reduce the whole to one single principle |
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156 | (2) |
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Man cannot attain to the knowledge of natural laws, but by examining his nature, constitution, and state |
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158 | (1) |
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Religion: principle of the natural laws, that have God for their object |
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Consequences of this principle |
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159 | (2) |
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Self-love: the principle of those natural laws which concern ourselves |
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161 | (1) |
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Natural laws derived from this principle |
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162 | (1) |
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163 | (1) |
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1. Society is absolutely necessary for man |
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164 | (2) |
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Man by his constitution is very fit for society |
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166 | (1) |
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3. Our natural inclinations prompt us to look out for society |
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167 | (1) |
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Sociability. Principles of natural laws relative to other men |
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168 | (1) |
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Natural laws which flow from sociability |
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169 | (2) |
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The public good ought always to be the supreme rule |
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170 | (1) |
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The spirit of sociability ought to be universal |
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To observe a natural equality |
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To preserve a benevolence even towards our enemies. Self-defence is permitted, revenge is not |
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171 | (2) |
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These three principles have all the requisite characters |
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173 | (1) |
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Remarks on Pussendorf's system |
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174 | (1) |
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The critics have carried their censures too far against him in this respect |
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Of the connexion between our natural duties |
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175 | (1) |
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Of the opposition that sometimes happens between these very duties |
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176 | (2) |
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Natural law obligatory, and natural law of simple permission. General principle of the law of permission |
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178 | (1) |
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Two species of natural law; one primitive, the other secondary |
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179 | (2) |
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That natural laws have been sufficiently notified; of their proper characters, the obligation they produce, &c |
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181 | (12) |
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God has sufficiently notified the laws of nature to man |
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Men may assist one another in this respect |
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The manner in which the principles of the laws of nature have been established, is a fresh proof of the reality of those laws |
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182 | (1) |
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Natural laws are the effect of the divine goodness |
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183 | (1) |
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The laws of nature do not depend on an arbitrary institution |
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184 | (2) |
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Our opinion is not very wide from that of Grotius |
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186 | (1) |
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The effect of the laws of nature, is an obligation of conforming thereto our conduct |
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187 | (1) |
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Natural laws are obligatory in respect to all men |
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188 | (1) |
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Grotius's opinion with regard to divine, positive, and universal law |
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189 | (1) |
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Natural laws are immutable, and admit of no dispensation |
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190 | (3) |
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Of the eternity of natural laws |
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193 | (9) |
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How civil societies are formed |
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The civil state does not destroy but improve the state of nature |
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True ideas of civil society |
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194 | (1) |
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States are considered under the notion of moral persons |
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What is the law of nations |
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195 | (1) |
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196 | (1) |
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General principle of the law of nations; what polity consists in |
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Inquiry into Grotius's opinion concerning the law of nations |
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197 | (2) |
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Two sorts of law of nations; one of necessity and obligatory by itself; the other arbitrary and conventional |
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199 | (1) |
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Use of the foregoing remarks |
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200 | (2) |
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Whether there is any morality of actions, any obligation or duty, antecedent to the laws of nature, and independent of the idea of a legislator |
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202 | (17) |
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Different opinions of ethic writers with respect to the first principle of morality |
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Principles relating to this question |
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203 | (2) |
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Three rules of human actions. 1. Moral sense. 2. Reason. 3. The divine will |
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205 | (1) |
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These three principles ought to be united |
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Of the primitive cause of obligation |
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206 | (2) |
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All rules are of themselves obligatory |
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Obligation may be more or less strong |
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208 | (1) |
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Reason alone is sufficient to impose some obligation on man |
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209 | (1) |
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Objection. No body can oblige himself |
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210 | (1) |
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211 | (1) |
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212 | (1) |
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Duty may be taken in a loose or strict sense |
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213 | (1) |
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Result of what has been hitherto said |
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214 | (2) |
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This manner of establishing morality does not weaken the system of natural law |
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216 | (1) |
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Grotius's opinion examined |
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217 | (1) |
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In order to have a perfect system of morality, we should join it with religion |
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218 | (1) |
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Consequences of the preceding chapter: reflexions on the distinctions of just, honest, and useful |
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219 | (6) |
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There is a great deal of ambiguity and mistake concerning this subject |
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Of just, honest, useful, order, and fitness |
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220 | (1) |
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Just, honest, and useful, are distinct things, and must not be confounded |
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221 | (2) |
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But tho' they are distinct, yet they are naturally connected |
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Whether an action is just, because God commands it? |
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223 | (2) |
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In what the beauty of virtue and the perfection of man consists? |
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Of the application of natural laws to human actions; and first of conscience |
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225 | (12) |
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What is meant by applying the laws to human actions |
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226 | (1) |
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Conscience supposes a knowledge of the law |
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227 | (1) |
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228 | (2) |
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Antecedent and subsequent conscience. Fourth rule |
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230 | (1) |
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Subsequent conscience is either quiet, or uneasy |
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231 | (1) |
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Decisive and dubious conscience. Fifth, sixth, and seventh rule |
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232 | (2) |
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Scrupulous conscience. Eighth rule |
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234 | (2) |
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Right and erroneous conscience. Ninth rule |
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Demonstrative and probable conscience. Tenth rule |
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236 | (1) |
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Of the merit and demerit of human actions; and of their imputation relative to the laws of nature |
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237 | (11) |
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Distinction of imputability and imputation. Of the nature of a moral cause |
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Of the nature of imputation. It supposes a knowledge of the law as well as of the fact |
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238 | (1) |
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239 | (1) |
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Principles. 1. We ought not to infer actual imputation from imputability only |
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240 | (1) |
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2. Imputation supposes some connexion between the action and its consequences |
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241 | (1) |
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3. Foundations of merit and demerit |
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242 | (1) |
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In what merit and demerit consists |
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243 | (1) |
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4. Merit and demerit have their degrees; and so has imputation |
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244 | (1) |
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5. Imputation is either simple or efficacious |
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245 | (1) |
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6. Effects of one and the other |
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7. If all those who are concerned, do not impute an action, it is supposed not to have been done |
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246 | (1) |
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Difference between the imputation of good and bad actions |
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247 | (1) |
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Application of those principles to different species of actions, in order to judge in what manner they ought to be imputed |
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248 | (18) |
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What actions are actually imputed? |
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Actions of such as have not the use of reason |
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Of what's done in drunkenness |
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Of things that are impossible. Of the want of opportunity |
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249 | (1) |
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Of events produced by external causes |
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250 | (1) |
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Of what is done thro' ignorance or error |
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Of the effect of temperament, habits, or passions |
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251 | (1) |
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252 | (1) |
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Forced actions are in themselves either good, bad, or indifferent |
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253 | (2) |
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Why a bad action, tho' forced, may be imputed |
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255 | (2) |
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257 | (1) |
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Of actions in which more persons than one are concerned |
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258 | (2) |
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Three sorts of moral causes; principal, subaltern; and collateral |
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260 | (4) |
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Application of these distinctions |
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264 | (2) |
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Of the authority and sanction of natural laws: and of the good and evil that naturally and generally follows from virtue and vice |
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266 | (14) |
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What is meant by the authority of natural laws |
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The observance of natural laws forms the happiness of man and society |
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267 | (1) |
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Explications on the state of the question |
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Proof of the above mentioned truth, by reason |
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268 | (1) |
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Proof's by experience. 1. Virtue is of itself the principle of an inward satisfaction; and vice a principle of disquiet and trouble |
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269 | (1) |
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Of external goods and evils, which are the consequence of virtue and vice |
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270 | (1) |
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These different effects of virtue and vice are still greater among those who are invested with power and authority |
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271 | (1) |
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Confirmation of this truth by the confession of all nations |
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272 | (1) |
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Confirmation of the same truth by the absurdity of the contrary |
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Answer to some particular objections |
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273 | (2) |
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The advantage always ranges itself on the side of virtue; and this is the first sanction of the laws of nature |
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275 | (1) |
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General difficulty drawn from the exceptions, which render this first sanction insufficient |
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276 | (3) |
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The goods and evils of nature and fortune are distributed unequally, and not according to each person's merit |
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The evils produced by injustice fall as well upon the innocent as the guilty |
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Sometimes even virtue itself is the cause of persecution |
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277 | (2) |
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The means which human prudence employs to remedy those disorders, are likewise insufficient |
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The difficulty proposed, is of great consequence |
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279 | (1) |
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Proofs of the immortality of the foul. That there is a sanction properly so called in respect to natural laws |
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280 | (17) |
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Division of opinions. How is it possible to know the will of God in respect to this point |
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Whether the soul is immortal? |
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282 | (1) |
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First proof. The nature of the soul seems intirely distinct from that of the body |
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Death does not therefore necessarily imply the annihilation of the soul |
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283 | (1) |
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284 | (1) |
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Confirmation of the preceding truth. Nothing in nature is annihilated |
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Second proof. The excellency of the soul |
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285 | (1) |
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Confirmations. Our faculties are always susceptible of a greater degree of perfection |
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286 | (1) |
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287 | (1) |
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Third proof, drawn from our natural dispositions and desires |
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288 | (1) |
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The sanction of natural laws will shew itself in a future life |
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289 | (1) |
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First proof, drawn from the nature of man considered on the moral side |
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290 | (1) |
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Second proof, drawn from the perfections of God |
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291 | (4) |
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The objection drawn from the present state of things serves to prove the sentiment it opposes |
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295 | (1) |
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The belief of a future state has been received by all nations |
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296 | (1) |
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That the proofs we have alledged have such a probability and fitness, as renders them sufficient to fix our belief, and to determine our conduct |
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297 | (1) |
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The proofs we have given of the sanction of natural laws are sufficient |
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Objection. These proofs contain no more than a probability or fitness. General answer |
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What is meant by a probability or fitness |
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298 | (1) |
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General foundation of this manner of reasoning |
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299 | (1) |
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This kind of fitness is very strong in respect to natural law |
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300 | (1) |
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This fitness has different degrees. Principles to judge of it |
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Application of these principles to our subject |
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301 | (2) |
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Comparison of the two opposite systems |
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The system of the sanction of natural laws is far preferable to the opposite system |
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303 | (1) |
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304 | (2) |
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Of the influence which those proofs ought to have over our conduct. We should act in this world on the foundation of the belief of a future state |
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'Tis a necessary consequence of our nature and state |
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306 | (1) |
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Reason lays us under an obligation of so doing |
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307 | (1) |
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'Tis a duty that God himself imposes on us |
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308 | |
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109 | |
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That which is already probable by reason only, is set in full evidence by revelation |
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