Mind and Cognition An Anthology
by Lycan, William G.; Prinz, Jesse J.Edition: 3rd
Format: Paperback
Pub. Date: 2008-02-11
Publisher(s): Wiley-Blackwell
Other versions by this Author
-
Free Shipping on All Orders!
*excludes Marketplace items.
List Price: $74.61
Buy New
Usually Ships in 8 - 10 Business Days.
$70.07
Rent Textbook
Select for Price
Used Textbook
We're Sorry
Sold Out
eTextbook
We're Sorry
Not Available
How Marketplace Works:
- This item is offered by an independent seller and not shipped from our warehouse
- Item details like edition and cover design may differ from our description; see seller's comments before ordering.
- Sellers much confirm and ship within two business days; otherwise, the order will be cancelled and refunded.
- Marketplace purchases cannot be returned to eCampus.com. Contact the seller directly for inquiries; if no response within two days, contact customer service.
- Additional shipping costs apply to Marketplace purchases. Review shipping costs at checkout.
Summary
First published in 1990, Mind and Cognition: An Anthology is now firmly established as a popular teaching apparatus for upper level undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of mind. This collection of classic and contemporary articles in philosophy of mind and cognition provides the reader with an overview of the complex, sophisticated and sometimes conflicting developments in theories of mind that have taken place over the last 40 years, making available to students, teachers and researchers the very best and most influential contributions to the discipline. For this new edition, 20 new readings are included and substantial revisions restore the balance (from the first edition) between the traditional areas of philosophy of mind and cutting edge areas of philosophy of cognitive science, such as situated cognition, animal minds and emotion. The emphasis in selection throughout has been on quality and teachability, making this volume a vital resource.
Author Biography
William G. Lycan is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He has published widely in the field of philosophy of mind and language. His publications include Consciousness (1987), Judgement and Justification (1988), and Consciousness and Experience (1996).
Jesse J. Prinz is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He works primarily in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. His books include Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis (2002), Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (2004), and The Emotional Construction of Morals (2007).
Table of Contents
| Preface to the Third Edition | p. xi |
| Preface to the First Edition | p. xii |
| Acknowledgments | p. xiii |
| Ontology: The Identity Theory and Functionalism | p. 1 |
| Introduction | p. 3 |
| Behaviorism | p. 15 |
| Excerpt from About Behaviorism | p. 17 |
| The Identity Theory and Machine Functionalism | p. 23 |
| Is Consciousness a Brain Process? | p. 25 |
| The Causal Theory of the Mind | p. 31 |
| The Nature of Mental States | p. 40 |
| Troubles with Functionalism (excerpt) | p. 48 |
| Anomalous Monism | p. 53 |
| Mental Events | p. 55 |
| Homuncular and Teleological Functionalism | p. 67 |
| The Continuity of Levels of Nature | p. 69 |
| Intentionality | p. 85 |
| Introduction | p. 87 |
| Psychosemantics | p. 93 |
| Information and Representation | p. 95 |
| Biosemantics | p. 105 |
| A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics (excerpt) | p. 116 |
| Other Approaches to Intentionality | p. 125 |
| Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality | p. 127 |
| The Computational Theory of Mind and Artificial Intelligence | p. 143 |
| Introduction | p. 145 |
| The Language of Thought and Computationalism | p. 151 |
| Why There Has to Be and How There Could Be a Private Language | p. 153 |
| Which Language Do We Think With? | p. 171 |
| Artificial Intelligence | p. 193 |
| Semantic Engines: An Introduction to Mind Design | p. 195 |
| Can Computers Think? | p. 213 |
| Eliminativism, Neurophilosophy, and Anti-Representationalism | p. 221 |
| Introduction | p. 223 |
| Eliminativism | p. 229 |
| Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes | p. 231 |
| Connectionism | p. 245 |
| Neural Representation and Neural Computation | p. 247 |
| Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture (excerpt) | p. 269 |
| Dynamical Systems Theory and Robotics | p. 273 |
| What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation? | p. 275 |
| Intelligence Without Representation | p. 298 |
| Instrumentalism and Folk Psychology | p. 313 |
| Introduction | p. 315 |
| Instrumentalism | p. 321 |
| True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works | p. 323 |
| Dennett on Intentional Systems | p. 337 |
| Real Patterns | p. 351 |
| Simulationism and the Theory Theory | p. 367 |
| Folk Psychology as Simulation | p. 369 |
| Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory? (excerpt) | p. 379 |
| Mental Causation, Externalism, and Self-Knowledge | p. 393 |
| Introduction | p. 395 |
| For and Against Folk Psychology | p. 403 |
| Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis | p. 405 |
| Folk Psychology is Here to Stay | p. 419 |
| Supervenient Causation | p. 437 |
| Mental Causation | p. 439 |
| Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical | p. 459 |
| For and Against Externalism | p. 475 |
| Individualism and Supervenience | p. 477 |
| The Argument from Causal Powers | p. 497 |
| Reference, Causal Powers, Externalist Intuitions and Unicorns | p. 515 |
| Self-Knowledge | p. 527 |
| Knowing One's Own Mind | p. 529 |
| Externalism and Inference | p. 543 |
| Radical Externalism | p. 553 |
| The Extended Mind | p. 555 |
| Consciousness, Qualia, and Subjectivity | p. 565 |
| Introduction | p. 567 |
| What Is Consciousness? | p. 573 |
| How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness | p. 575 |
| What Should We Expect from a Theory of Consciousness? | p. 583 |
| Consciousness and its Place in Nature (excerpt) | p. 595 |
| Conscious Awareness | p. 603 |
| A Theory of Consciousness (excerpt) | p. 605 |
| The Superiority of HOP to HOT | p. 617 |
| Perception without Awareness | p. 630 |
| What It's Like | p. 655 |
| Epiphenomenal Qualia | p. 657 |
| Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos? | p. 664 |
| Qualia | p. 679 |
| The Intrinsic Quality of Experience | p. 681 |
| Sensation and the Content of Experience | p. 693 |
| Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism? | p. 707 |
| Perceptual Content | p. 725 |
| Introduction | p. 727 |
| Simple Seeing | p. 731 |
| Excerpts from The Varieties of Reference | p. 741 |
| Non-conceptual Content | p. 748 |
| Experience Without the Head | p. 760 |
| Animal Minds | p. 777 |
| Introduction | p. 779 |
| Rational Animals | p. 781 |
| The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything it is Like to be a Honey Bee? | p. 788 |
| Why the Question of Animal Consciousness Might Not Matter Very Much | p. 805 |
| Emotion | p. 821 |
| Introduction | p. 823 |
| Emotions and Choice | p. 827 |
| Embodied Emotions | p. 839 |
| Is Emotion a Natural Kind? | p. 850 |
| Author Index | p. 863 |
| Subject Index | p. 871 |
| Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. |
An electronic version of this book is available through VitalSource.
This book is viewable on PC, Mac, iPhone, iPad, iPod Touch, and most smartphones.
By purchasing, you will be able to view this book online, as well as download it, for the chosen number of days.
Digital License
You are licensing a digital product for a set duration. Durations are set forth in the product description, with "Lifetime" typically meaning five (5) years of online access and permanent download to a supported device. All licenses are non-transferable.
More details can be found here.
A downloadable version of this book is available through the eCampus Reader or compatible Adobe readers.
Applications are available on iOS, Android, PC, Mac, and Windows Mobile platforms.
Please view the compatibility matrix prior to purchase.