Preface to the Third Edition |
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xix | |
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1 | (12) |
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The Rationale for Regulation and Antitrust Policies |
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2 | (1) |
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3 | (2) |
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The Changing Character of Antitrust Issues |
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4 | (1) |
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Reasoning behind Antitrust Regulations |
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4 | (1) |
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5 | (2) |
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Development of Economic Regulation |
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6 | (1) |
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Factors in Setting Rate Regulations |
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6 | (1) |
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Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation |
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7 | (2) |
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8 | (1) |
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9 | (1) |
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10 | (1) |
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10 | (1) |
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11 | (2) |
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The Making of a Regulation |
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13 | (46) |
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State versus Federal Regulation: The Federalism Debate |
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14 | (4) |
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15 | (1) |
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Advantages of National Regulations |
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16 | (1) |
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The Overlap of State and Federal Regulations |
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17 | (1) |
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The Character of the Rulemaking Process |
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18 | (4) |
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The Chronology of New Regulations |
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18 | (4) |
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Nature of the Regulatory Oversight Process |
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22 | (12) |
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The Nixon and Ford Administrations |
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23 | (1) |
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The Carter Administration |
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24 | (2) |
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The Reagan Administration |
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26 | (1) |
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26 | (1) |
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The Clinton Administration |
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27 | (1) |
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Regulatory Reform Legislation |
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27 | (1) |
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28 | (2) |
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Discounting Deferred Effects |
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30 | (2) |
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32 | (2) |
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The Criteria Applied in the Oversight Process |
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34 | (3) |
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Regulatory Success Stories |
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34 | (1) |
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Promotion of Cost-Effective Regulation |
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35 | (1) |
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Distortion of Benefit and Cost Estimates |
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36 | (1) |
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The Regulatory Role of Price and Quality |
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37 | (1) |
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The Impact of the Oversight Process |
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37 | (7) |
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38 | (1) |
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Other Measures of the Size of Regulation |
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38 | (4) |
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The Character of Regulatory Oversight Actions |
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42 | (2) |
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What Do Regulators Maximize? |
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44 | (2) |
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44 | (1) |
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Other Theories of Influence Patterns |
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45 | (1) |
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Comprehensive Models of Regulatory Objectives |
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45 | (1) |
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46 | (1) |
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47 | (1) |
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Appendix: Trends in Regulatory Agency Budgets and Staff |
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48 | (11) |
I ANTITRUST |
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59 | (236) |
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Introduction to Antitrust |
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61 | (14) |
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Industrial Organization Analysis |
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61 | (4) |
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63 | (1) |
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64 | (1) |
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64 | (1) |
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65 | (7) |
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67 | (4) |
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Exemptions from Antitrust |
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71 | (1) |
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Summary and Overview of Part I |
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72 | (1) |
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Appendix: Antitrust Statutes |
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72 | (3) |
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72 | (1) |
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73 | (1) |
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Federal Trade Commission Act |
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74 | (1) |
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Efficiency and Technical Progress |
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75 | (22) |
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75 | (13) |
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Partial Equilibrium Welfare Tools |
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76 | (2) |
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Monopoly-versus-Competition Example |
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78 | (2) |
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80 | (1) |
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81 | (3) |
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84 | (1) |
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85 | (1) |
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Estimates of the Welfare Loss from Monopoly |
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86 | (2) |
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88 | (6) |
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Importance of Technological Change |
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89 | (2) |
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91 | (3) |
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94 | (1) |
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95 | (2) |
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Oligopoly, Collusion, and Antitrust |
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97 | (46) |
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97 | (4) |
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97 | (2) |
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Compatibility of Standards |
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99 | (1) |
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The Strategic Form of a Game |
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100 | (1) |
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101 | (1) |
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101 | (11) |
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102 | (6) |
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Other Models of Oligopoly |
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108 | (1) |
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109 | (3) |
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112 | (13) |
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112 | (5) |
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117 | (4) |
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121 | (4) |
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Antitrust Law toward Price Fixing |
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125 | (10) |
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Economic Analysis of Legal Categories |
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126 | (1) |
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127 | (4) |
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131 | (4) |
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135 | (1) |
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136 | (1) |
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137 | (1) |
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Game Theory: Formal Definitions |
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137 | (1) |
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138 | (5) |
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138 | (2) |
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140 | (3) |
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Market Structure and Strategic Competition |
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143 | (48) |
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143 | (19) |
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143 | (7) |
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150 | (2) |
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152 | (10) |
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162 | (8) |
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162 | (3) |
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Dynamic Analysis: Limit Pricing |
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165 | (5) |
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170 | (13) |
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171 | (7) |
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Investment in Cost-Reducing Capital |
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178 | (4) |
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182 | (1) |
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Preemption and Brand Proliferation |
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183 | (3) |
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186 | (1) |
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186 | (5) |
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191 | (28) |
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Antitrust Laws and Merger Trends |
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192 | (3) |
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195 | (3) |
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195 | (1) |
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195 | (1) |
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Reducing Management Inefficiencies |
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196 | (2) |
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198 | (1) |
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198 | (15) |
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199 | (5) |
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Effects of Airline Mergers |
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204 | (1) |
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205 | (5) |
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The 1992 Merger Guidelines |
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210 | (3) |
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213 | (4) |
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214 | (1) |
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Anticompetitive Effects and Cases |
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215 | (2) |
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217 | (1) |
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217 | (2) |
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Vertical Mergers and Restrictions |
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219 | (38) |
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219 | (14) |
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219 | (4) |
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223 | (6) |
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Extension of Monopoly: Fixed Proportions |
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229 | (1) |
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Extension of Monopoly: Variable Proportions |
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230 | (2) |
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232 | (1) |
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233 | (20) |
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234 | (4) |
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238 | (2) |
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240 | (1) |
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241 | (12) |
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253 | (1) |
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254 | (3) |
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Monopolization and Price Discrimination |
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257 | (38) |
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The Possession of Monopoly Power |
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258 | (4) |
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262 | (1) |
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263 | (14) |
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1890--1940: Standard Oil and United States Steel |
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263 | (5) |
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1940--1970: Alcoa and United Shoe Machinery |
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268 | (4) |
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1970 to Present: Kodak, Cereals, IBM, and Others |
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272 | (2) |
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1994--1998: Microsoft and Network Effects |
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274 | (3) |
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Predatory Pricing: Proposed Legal Definitions |
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277 | (7) |
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279 | (1) |
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The Output Restriction Rule |
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280 | (3) |
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Joskow-Klevorick Two-Stage Rule |
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283 | (1) |
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Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act |
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284 | (6) |
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Systematic Discrimination |
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284 | (6) |
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Unsystematic Discrimination |
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290 | (2) |
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290 | (2) |
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292 | (1) |
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292 | (3) |
II ECONOMIC REGULATION |
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295 | (340) |
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Introduction to Economic Regulation |
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297 | (40) |
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What Is Economic Regulation? |
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297 | (1) |
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Instruments of Regulation |
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298 | (3) |
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298 | (1) |
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299 | (1) |
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Control of Entry and Exit |
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299 | (1) |
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Control of Other Variables |
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300 | (1) |
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Brief History of Economic Regulation |
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301 | (7) |
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301 | (1) |
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302 | (6) |
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308 | (5) |
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Overview of the Regulatory Process |
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308 | (1) |
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309 | (1) |
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Independent Regulatory Commissions |
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309 | (2) |
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311 | (2) |
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313 | (21) |
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Normative Analysis as a Positive Theory |
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314 | (3) |
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317 | (1) |
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Economic Theory of Regulation |
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318 | (12) |
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Testing Theories of Regulation |
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330 | (4) |
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Summary and Overview of Part II |
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334 | (1) |
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335 | (2) |
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Theory of Natural Monopoly |
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337 | (24) |
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The Natural Monopoly Problem |
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337 | (7) |
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Permanent and Temporary Natural Monopoly |
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337 | (2) |
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Subadditivity and Multiproduct Monopoly |
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339 | (5) |
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Alternative Policy Solutions |
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344 | (14) |
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344 | (12) |
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356 | (1) |
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356 | (2) |
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358 | (1) |
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358 | (3) |
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Natural Monopoly Regulation and Electric Power |
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361 | (34) |
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362 | (2) |
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362 | (1) |
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363 | (1) |
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364 | (10) |
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364 | (2) |
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366 | (2) |
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The Sliding Scale Plan and Yardstick Competition |
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368 | (1) |
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Price Caps and Performance Standards |
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369 | (2) |
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371 | (3) |
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374 | (5) |
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375 | (2) |
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377 | (2) |
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379 | (7) |
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Costs of Power Production |
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379 | (2) |
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381 | (5) |
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Regulation/Deregulation of Electric Power |
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386 | (6) |
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Effectiveness of Price Regulation |
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386 | (2) |
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388 | (4) |
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392 | (1) |
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393 | (2) |
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Franchise Bidding and Cable Television |
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395 | (38) |
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Theory of Franchise Bidding |
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395 | (14) |
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Competition at the Bidding Stage |
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397 | (8) |
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Contractual Arrangements for the Postbidding Stage |
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405 | (4) |
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Assessment of Franchise Bidding |
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409 | (1) |
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409 | (20) |
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Historical/Regulatory Background |
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410 | (2) |
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Cable Television as a Natural Monopoly |
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412 | (5) |
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417 | (1) |
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Assessment of Franchise Bidding |
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418 | (5) |
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423 | (4) |
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Is There a Role for Government Intervention? |
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427 | (2) |
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429 | (1) |
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430 | (3) |
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433 | (20) |
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434 | (1) |
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Positive Theory of Public Enterprise |
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435 | (7) |
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Managerial Model of a Firm |
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436 | (1) |
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Managerial Model of a Private Enterprise |
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437 | (1) |
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Managerial Model of a Public Enterprise |
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438 | (3) |
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Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise |
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441 | (1) |
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Municipal Electric Utilities |
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442 | (5) |
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442 | (2) |
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Allocative Efficiency Comparison |
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444 | (2) |
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Productive Efficiency Comparison |
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446 | (1) |
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Assessment of Private versus Public Utilities |
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447 | (1) |
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447 | (3) |
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450 | (2) |
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452 | (1) |
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Dynamic Issues in Natural Monopoly Regulation: Telecommunications |
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453 | (42) |
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Transformation of a Natural Monopoly |
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453 | (27) |
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Basis for Natural Monopoly Regulation |
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454 | (3) |
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Sources of Natural Monopoly Transformation |
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457 | (3) |
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460 | (4) |
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Intercity Telecommunications Market |
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464 | (12) |
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Local-Exchange Telecommunications Market |
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476 | (4) |
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Separation of Regulated Monopolies and Competitive Markets |
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480 | (7) |
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Benefits and Costs of Separation |
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481 | (3) |
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484 | (2) |
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Telecommunications and Computers |
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486 | (1) |
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The Future of the Telecommunications Industry: Digital Convergence |
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487 | (5) |
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Telecommunications Act of 1996 |
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488 | (1) |
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489 | (3) |
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492 | (1) |
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493 | (2) |
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The Regulation of Potentially Competitive Markets: Theory and Estimation Methods |
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495 | (34) |
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Theory of Price and Entry/Exit Regulation |
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496 | (16) |
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Direct Effects of Price and Entry/Exit Regulation: The Competitive Model |
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496 | (4) |
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Direct Effects of Price and Entry/Exit Regulation: The Imperfectly Competitive Model |
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500 | (4) |
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Some Indirect Effects of Price and Entry Regulation |
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504 | (3) |
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Some Indirect Effects of Price and Exit Regulation |
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507 | (2) |
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Regulation and Innovation |
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509 | (3) |
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Methods for Estimating the Effects of Regulation |
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512 | (13) |
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Overview of Estimation Methods |
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512 | (1) |
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512 | (2) |
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Application: New York Stock Exchange |
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514 | (1) |
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515 | (1) |
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Application: Advertising of Eyeglasses |
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516 | (1) |
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517 | (1) |
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Application: State Usury Laws |
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518 | (4) |
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Measuring the Return to Price and Entry Restrictions: Taxicab Regulation |
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522 | (3) |
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525 | (1) |
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526 | (3) |
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Economic Regulation of Transportation: Surface Freight and Airlines |
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529 | (56) |
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529 | (2) |
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Surface Freight Transportation |
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531 | (21) |
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531 | (4) |
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Description of Regulatory Practices |
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535 | (2) |
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537 | (13) |
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550 | (2) |
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552 | (31) |
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552 | (2) |
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Description of Regulatory Practices |
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554 | (1) |
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555 | (13) |
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Competition and Antitrust Policy after Deregulation |
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568 | (14) |
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Lessons from Regulation and Deregulation |
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582 | (1) |
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583 | (1) |
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584 | (1) |
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Economic Regulation of Energy: Crude Oil and Natural Gas |
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585 | (50) |
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The Theory of Price Ceilings |
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587 | (4) |
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Price and Quantity Regulation of the Crude Oil Industry |
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591 | (5) |
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594 | (2) |
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596 | (8) |
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596 | (1) |
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Rationale for Prorationing |
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597 | (5) |
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Solutions to the Common Pool Problem |
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602 | (1) |
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603 | (1) |
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Mandatory Oil Import Program |
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604 | (3) |
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604 | (1) |
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605 | (2) |
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607 | (9) |
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607 | (2) |
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Effects of Price Regulation |
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609 | (7) |
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Price Regulation of the Natural Gas Industry |
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616 | (15) |
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618 | (1) |
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619 | (2) |
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Effects of Price Regulation |
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621 | (8) |
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Transition from Regulation to Markets in the Transmission of Natural Gas |
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629 | (2) |
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631 | (1) |
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632 | (3) |
III HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION |
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635 | (202) |
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Introduction: The Emergence of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation |
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637 | (24) |
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638 | (3) |
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Measuring Mortality Risks |
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640 | (1) |
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The Infeasibility of a No-Risk Society |
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641 | (5) |
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642 | (2) |
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Irrationality and Biases in Risk Perception |
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644 | (2) |
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646 | (4) |
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647 | (1) |
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647 | (1) |
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The Role of Heterogeneity |
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648 | (2) |
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Uncertainty and Conservatism |
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650 | (4) |
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The Role of Risk Ambiguity |
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652 | (2) |
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The Role of Political Factors |
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654 | (3) |
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Economic Models of Environmental Policies |
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654 | (2) |
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656 | (1) |
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Summary and Overview of Part III |
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657 | (2) |
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659 | (1) |
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660 | (1) |
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Valuing Life and Other Nonmonetary Benefits |
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661 | (26) |
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Policy Evaluation Principles |
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662 | (2) |
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Willingness to Pay versus Other Approaches |
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664 | (2) |
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Variations in the Value of Life |
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666 | (3) |
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669 | (4) |
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Empirical Estimates of the Value of Life |
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673 | (2) |
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Value of Life for Regulatory Policies |
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675 | (3) |
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Survey Approaches to Valuing Policy Effects |
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678 | (3) |
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680 | (1) |
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Exploratory Nature of the Survey Approach |
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681 | (1) |
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Sensitivity Analysis and Cost Effectiveness |
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681 | (1) |
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682 | (1) |
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Establishing Prices for Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation |
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683 | (1) |
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684 | (3) |
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687 | (38) |
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The Coase Theorem for Externalities |
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688 | (9) |
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The Coase Theorem as a Bargaining Game |
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689 | (1) |
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690 | (2) |
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Long-Run Efficiency Concerns |
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692 | (1) |
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Transactions Costs and Other Problems |
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692 | (1) |
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693 | (3) |
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Special Features of Environmental Contexts |
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696 | (1) |
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Selecting the Optimal Policy: Standards versus Fines |
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697 | (8) |
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Setting the Pollution Tax |
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698 | (2) |
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The Role of Heterogeneity |
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700 | (1) |
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701 | (2) |
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703 | (1) |
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Cost Heterogeneity for Water Pollution Control |
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704 | (1) |
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Current Market Trading Policies |
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705 | (4) |
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The Future of Market Approaches |
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708 | (1) |
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Global Warming and Irreversible Environmental Effects |
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709 | (3) |
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Assessing the Merits of Global-Warming Policies |
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709 | (2) |
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How Should We React to Uncertainty? |
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711 | (1) |
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Multiperson Decisions and Group Externalities |
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712 | (3) |
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712 | (1) |
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The N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma |
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713 | (1) |
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Applications of the Prisoner's Dilemma |
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714 | (1) |
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The Enforcement and Performance of Environmental Regulation |
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715 | (7) |
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Enforcement Options and Consequences |
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715 | (1) |
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716 | (3) |
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Contingent Valuation for the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill |
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719 | (2) |
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721 | (1) |
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722 | (1) |
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723 | (2) |
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725 | (36) |
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Emergence of Product Safety Regulations |
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725 | (1) |
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726 | (2) |
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Changing Emphasis of Product Regulation |
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|
728 | (1) |
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Premanufacturing Screening: The Case of Pharmaceuticals |
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729 | (5) |
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Weighing the Significance of Side Effects |
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730 | (1) |
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730 | (4) |
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The Behavioral Response to Product Safety Regulation |
|
|
734 | (5) |
|
Consumer's Potential for Muting Safety Device Benefits |
|
|
735 | (4) |
|
The Costs of Product Safety Regulation: The Automobile Industry Case |
|
|
739 | (5) |
|
Trends in Motor Vehicle and Home Accident Deaths |
|
|
744 | (3) |
|
|
744 | (1) |
|
The Decline of Accident Rates |
|
|
745 | (2) |
|
The Rise of Product Liability |
|
|
747 | (6) |
|
|
748 | (1) |
|
The Strict Liability Standard |
|
|
749 | (1) |
|
Events-Study Evidence on Liability Costs |
|
|
749 | (1) |
|
|
750 | (3) |
|
Risk Information and Hazard Warnings |
|
|
753 | (2) |
|
Self-Certification of Safe Products |
|
|
754 | (1) |
|
Government Determination of Safety |
|
|
754 | (1) |
|
Alternatives to Direct Command and Control Regulation |
|
|
755 | (2) |
|
The Future of Product Safety Policy |
|
|
757 | (1) |
|
|
758 | (3) |
|
Regulation of Workplace Health and Safety |
|
|
761 | (38) |
|
The Potential for Inefficiencies |
|
|
763 | (1) |
|
How Markets Can Promote Safety |
|
|
763 | (2) |
|
Compensating Wage Differential Theory |
|
|
765 | (2) |
|
|
767 | (2) |
|
On-the-Job Experience and Worker Quit Rates |
|
|
769 | (1) |
|
Inadequacies in the Market |
|
|
770 | (2) |
|
Informational Problems and Irrationalities |
|
|
771 | (1) |
|
|
771 | (1) |
|
OSHA's Regulatory Approach |
|
|
772 | (13) |
|
Setting OSHA Standard Levels |
|
|
772 | (3) |
|
The Nature of OSHA Standards |
|
|
775 | (2) |
|
The Reform of OSHA Standards |
|
|
777 | (1) |
|
Regulatory Reform Initiatives |
|
|
777 | (1) |
|
Changes in OSHA Standards |
|
|
777 | (3) |
|
OSHA's Enforcement Strategy |
|
|
780 | (2) |
|
|
782 | (1) |
|
|
783 | (1) |
|
|
783 | (1) |
|
|
784 | (1) |
|
The Impact of OSHA Enforcement on Worker Safety |
|
|
785 | (9) |
|
OSHA Regulations in Different Situations |
|
|
787 | (1) |
|
OSHA and Other Factors Affecting Injuries |
|
|
788 | (6) |
|
The Role of Workers' Compensation |
|
|
794 | (1) |
|
Agenda for Policy Reform Efforts |
|
|
795 | (2) |
|
|
797 | (2) |
|
Patents and Pharmaceuticals |
|
|
799 | (38) |
|
Economics of Invention and Patents |
|
|
799 | (16) |
|
|
801 | (1) |
|
Incentives to Invent: Monopoly versus Competition |
|
|
802 | (4) |
|
Welfare Analysis of Patents |
|
|
806 | (9) |
|
Pharmaceuticals and the Role of Patents |
|
|
815 | (18) |
|
|
816 | (9) |
|
The 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act |
|
|
825 | (3) |
|
Other Policies that Affect R&D Incentives |
|
|
828 | (5) |
|
|
833 | (1) |
|
|
833 | (4) |
Author Index |
|
837 | (4) |
Subject Index |
|
841 | |