The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might

by
Format: Paperback
Pub. Date: 2002-02-04
Publisher(s): Cambridge University Press
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Summary

Successful coercion should be relatively simple for the United States. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States is without rivals in military might, political influence, or economic strength. Yet despite the lopsided US edge in raw power, regional foes persist in defying the threats and ultimatums brought by the United States and its allies. This book examines why some attempts to strong-arm an adversary work while others do not. It explores how coercion today differs from coercion during the Cold War. It describes the constraints on the United States emanating from the need to work within coalitions and the restrictions imposed by domestic politics, and it assesses the special challenges likely to arise when an adversary is a non-state actor or when the use of weapons of mass destruction is possible.

Author Biography

Daniel Byman is a policy analyst with the RAND Corporation and the Research Director of RAND's Center for Middle East Public Policy. Before coming to RAND, he worked as a political analyst for the U.S. government. Dr. Byman is the author of several books on international relations Matthew Waxman is an attorney and policy consultant in Washington, D.C. He has worked as a consultant on issues of American foreign and defense policy and international law at the RAND Corporation, and served as law clerk to Supreme Court Justice David H. Souter and U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Joel M. Flaum

Table of Contents

Foreword xi
Preface xiii
Acknowledgments xv
Introduction
1(24)
Defining coercion
3(6)
The role of inducements
9(1)
Models of coercion
10(4)
Coercion today: old wine in new bottles?
14(4)
Challenges to coercion today
18(3)
Structure
21(4)
PART ONE: COERCIVE STRATEGY MAKING 25(100)
The theory of coercion
30(18)
Measuring coercion
31(6)
Coercion as a dynamic contest: key analytic concepts
37(9)
The path ahead
46(2)
Coercive mechanisms
48(39)
Commonly used mechanisms
50(32)
Second-order coercion
82(3)
Conclusion
85(2)
Coercive instruments
87(38)
Air strikes
88(11)
Invasions and land grabs
99(3)
The threat of nuclear attack
102(3)
Sanctions and international isolation
105(12)
Support for an insurgency
117(3)
Combinations
120(3)
Conclusion
123(2)
PART TWO: THE CONTEXT OF COERCION TODAY 125(102)
Domestic politics and coercion
130(22)
Justifying force
132(2)
U.S. casualty sensitivity
134(3)
Sensitivity to adversary civilian suffering
137(5)
U.S. political constraints and adversary counter-coercion
142(6)
The asymmetry of constraints
148(2)
Conclusion
150(2)
Coercion and coalitions
152(23)
Why coalitions?
154(4)
Limits imposed by coalitions
158(13)
Coalitions and adversary counter-coercion
171(1)
Conclusion
172(3)
Humanitarian coercion and nonstate actors
175(26)
Humanitarian intervention and coercion
176(1)
The decision to intervene
177(4)
Common tasks during a humanitarian intervention
181(2)
Constraints on humanitarian coercion
183(7)
The challenge of nonstate adversaries
190(4)
Nonstate actors and counter-coercion
194(5)
Conclusion
199(2)
Weapons of mass destruction and U.S. coercion
201(26)
Understanding the danger
203(9)
WMD and escalation dominance
212(4)
Beyond the brink: how WMD use affects coercion
216(2)
Implications for coercive contests
218(6)
Conclusion
224(3)
PART THREE: THE FUTURE OF U.S. COERCION 227(14)
Challenges to strategy making
229(5)
Why policy makers and analysts disagree
234(2)
Coercion dynamics and credibility traps
236(3)
Final words
239(2)
Bibliography 241(24)
Index 265

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