
Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders : An Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
by United States Senate-
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Summary
Table of Contents
Prologue | p. XIII |
Introduction and Summary | p. 1 |
Committee's Mandate | p. 1 |
Committee Decision To Make Report Public | p. 2 |
Scope of Committee's Investigation | p. 2 |
Summary of Findings and Conclusions | p. 4 |
The Questions Presented | p. 4 |
Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Plots | p. 4 |
Summary of Findings and Conclusions on The Issues of Authority and Control | p. 6 |
Covert Action as a Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation | p. 9 |
Policy Development and Approval Mechanism | p. 9 |
The Concept of "Plausible Denial" | p. 11 |
Assassination Planning and Plots | p. 13 |
Congo | p. 13 |
Introduction | p. 13 |
Dulles Cable to Leopoldville: August 26, 1960 | p. 14 |
CIA Encouragement of Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate" Lumumba | p. 16 |
The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba | p. 19 |
The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Their Agents in the Congo | p. 37 |
The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing About Lumumba's Death in Katanga Province | p. 48 |
The Question of the Level at Which the Assassination Plot Was Authorized | p. 51 |
Cuba | p. 71 |
The Assassination Plots | p. 71 |
At What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Authorized Within the Central Intelligence Agency? | p. 91 |
At What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Authorized Outside of the Central Intelligence Agency? | p. 108 |
Institutionalizing Assassination: The "Executive Action" Capability | p. 181 |
Introduction | p. 181 |
The Question of White House Initiation, Authorization, or Knowledge of the Executive Action Project | p. 182 |
The Question of Authorization or Knowledge of the Executive Action Project by the DCI | p. 187 |
The Question of Whether Project ZR/RIFLE Was Connected to Any Actual Assassination Plots | p. 187 |
Trujillo | p. 191 |
Summary | p. 191 |
Background | p. 191 |
Initial Contact With Dissidents and Request for Arms | p. 192 |
Summer and Fall of 1960 | p. 194 |
January 12, 1961 Special Group Approval of "Limited Supplies of Small Arms and Other Material" | p. 196 |
January 20, 1961-April 17, 1961 (the Kennedy Administration through the Bay of Pigs) | p. 197 |
April 17, 1961-May 31, 1961 (Bay of Pigs Through Trujillo Assassination) | p. 205 |
May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter | p. 213 |
Diem | p. 217 |
Summary | p. 217 |
The Abortive Coup of August 1963 | p. 217 |
The November 1963 Coup | p. 220 |
Schneider | p. 225 |
Summary | p. 225 |
The President's Initial Instruction and Background | p. 227 |
CIA's Implementation of Track II | p. 233 |
CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup | p. 239 |
CIA/White House Communication During Track II | p. 246 |
Findings and Conclusions | p. 255 |
Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves | p. 255 |
Officials of the United States Government Initiated Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba | p. 255 |
No Foreign Leaders Were Killed as a Result of Assassination Plots Initiated by Officials of the United States | p. 256 |
American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy to Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Deaths of Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider | p. 256 |
The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived to be of Crisis Proportions | p. 256 |
American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions About Their Ability to Control the Actions of Coup Leaders | p. 256 |
CIA Officials Made Use of Known Underworld Figures in Assassination Efforts | p. 257 |
Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves | p. 257 |
The United States Should Not Engage in Assassination | p. 257 |
The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld Figures for Their Criminal Talents | p. 259 |
Findings and Conclusions Relating to Authorization and Control | p. 260 |
The Apparent Lack of Accountability in the Command and Control System Was Such That the Assassination Plots Could Have Been Undertaken Without Express Authorization | p. 261 |
Findings Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Were Authorized | p. 261 |
CIA Officials Involved in the Assassination Operations Perceived Assassination to Have Been a Permissible Course of Action | p. 264 |
The Failure in Communication Between Agency Officials in Charge of the Assassination Operations and their Superiors in the Agency and in the Administration was Due to: (a) The Failure of Subordinates to Disclose Their Plans and Operations to Their Superiors; and (b) The Failure of Superiors in the Climate of Violence and Aggressive Covert Actions Sanctioned by the Administrations to Rule Out Assassination as a Tool of Foreign Policy; To Make Clear to Their Subordinates That Assassination Was Impermissible; Or To Inquire Further After Receiving Indications That It Was Being Considered | p. 267 |
Practices Current at the Time in Which the Assassination Plots Occurred Were Revealed by the Record To Create the Risk of Confusion, Rashness and Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where Clarity and Sober Judgment Were Most Necessary | p. 277 |
Recommendations | p. 281 |
General Agreement That the United States Must Not Engage in Assassination | p. 281 |
CIA Directives Banning Assassination | p. 282 |
The Need for a Statute | p. 282 |
Epilogue | p. 285 |
Statement of Joinder | p. 286 |
Appendix A | p. 289 |
Appendix B | p. 291 |
Separate Views of Senator Philip A. Hart | p. 297 |
Additional Views of Senator Robert Morgan | p. 299 |
Additional Views of Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr | p. 303 |
Additional Views of Senator Barry Goldwater | p. 341 |
Supplemental Views of Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr | p. 345 |
Abbreviations of Citations | p. 347 |
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